1240a
διὸ ἐνίοτε ἀνομοίοις χαίρουσιν, οἷον αὐστηροὶ εὐτραπέλοις καὶ ὀξεῖς ῥαθύμοις. εἰς τὸ μέσον γὰρ καθίστανται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη φιλίας, καὶ τίνες διαφοραὶ καθ' ἃς λέγονται οἱ τε φίλοι καὶ οἱ φιλοῦντες καὶ οἱ φιλούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως ὥστε φίλοι εἶναι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου, εἴρηται: περὶ δὲ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ φίλον εἶναι ἢ μή, πολλὴν ἔχει ἐπίσκεψιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοις μάλιστα ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ
φίλος εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ χρώμενοι κανόνι κρίνουσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους φιλίαν: κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ δοκοῦνθ' ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μὲν ὑπεναντιοῦται, τὰ δ' ὅμοια φαίνεται ὄντα. ἔστι γάρ πως κατὰ ἀναλογίαν αὕτη ἡ φιλία, ἁπλῶς δ' οὔ. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ διῃρημένοις τὸ
φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν: δι' ἃ μᾶλλον οὕτως αὐτὸς αὑτῷ φίλος, <ὡσ> ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς καὶ ἐγκρατοῦς εἴρηται πῶς ἑκὼν ἢ ἄκων, τῷ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν πως πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὅμοιον τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰ φίλος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ καὶ ἐχθρός, καὶ εἰ ἀδικεῖ τις αὐτὸς αὑτόν. πάντα γὰρ ἐν δυσὶ
ταῦτα καὶ διῃρημένοις: ᾗ δὴ δύο πως καὶ ἡ ψυχή, ὑπάρχει πως ταῦτα, ᾗ δ' οὐ διῃρημένα, οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἕξεως [ὡσ] οἱ λοιποὶ τρόποι τοῦ φιλεῖν διωρισμένοι, καθ' οὓς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰώθαμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ φίλος εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενός τινι τἀγαθὰ ἢ οἷα
οἴεται ἀγαθά, μὴ δι' αὑτὸν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου ἕνεκα: ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ τὸ εἶναι βούλεται δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ μὴ δι' αὑτὸν, κἂν εἰ
μὴ διανέμων τἀγαθά, μὴ τῷ τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ἂν δόξειε μάλιστα φιλεῖν: ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ᾧ συζῆν αἱρεῖται δι' αὐτὴν τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, οἷον οἱ πατέρες
τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῖς τέκνοις, συζῶσι δ' ἑτέροις. μάχεται δὴ ταῦτα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα. οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἂν μὴ τὸ ἑαυτοῖς, οἳ δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶναι, οἳ δὲ τὸ συζῆν, οὐκ οἴονται φιλεῖσθαι. ἔτι τὸ ἀλγοῦντι συναλγεῖν μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι ἀγαπᾶν θήσομεν—οἷον οἱ δοῦλοι πρὸς τοὺς δεσπότας, ὅτι
χαλεποὶ ἀλγοῦντες, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' αὐτούς, ὥσπερ αἱ μητέρες τοῖς τέκνοις καὶ οἱ συνωδίνοντες ὄρνιθες. βούλεται γὰρ μάλιστά γε οὐ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδιψῆν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι [μὴ] ἐγγύτατα. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χαίρειν: <τὸ γὰρ χαίρειν> μὴ δι' ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐκεῖνον, ὅτι χαίρει, φιλικόν.
1240a
Hence sometimes people take delight in
persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the
active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the
middle state.
5.10
Hence
accidentally, as was said,
opposites
are dear to opposites also on account of the good.
It has, then, been said how many kinds of
friendship there are, and what are the different senses in which
people are termed friends, and also givers and objects of affection,
both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being
friends.
6.1
The question whether one is one's own friend
or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his
own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which
to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds,
and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love
of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly
similar.
6.2
For in a way
self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being
loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is
his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the
unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said
how one has those qualities
voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's
spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such
matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or
foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly.
For all these relations involve
two separate factors;
6.3
in
so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a
manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they
do not.
From the state of friendship for
oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which
we usually study it in our discourses.
For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for
somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on
his own account but for the other's sake;
6.4
and in another way when a man wishes another's
existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone
existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he
would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other;
6.5
and in another way
a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake
of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their
children's existence, though they associate with other people. All
these cases conflict with one another;
6.6
some men do not think they are loved unless the
friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their
existence is desired, others unless their society.
6.7
Again we shall reckon it
affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior
motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters
share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for
their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and
birds that share each other's pain.
6.8
For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only
feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same
pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his
thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same
as may be.
6.9
The same
principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a
friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is
rejoicing.